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A bstract
As the variety of m ethods used by biblical scholars m ul tiplies, new sub-disciplines are being born th a t all too often leave specialists isolated from each other. While at som e points the various m ethods com plem ent each other, at o thers they rem ain contradictory or m utually exclusive. Two of the newer such m ethods, literary criti cism and social-science criticism , have until now re m ained in isolation. In recent months, however, a dialo gue has begun to em erge that seeks to explore the com m on ground or lack th ereo f betw een these two methods.
This article is a beginning reflection by a social-science critic on some of the issues involved.
Biblical scholarship is perhaps at a m ajor crossroads in its m odem de velopm ent as regards the nature o f biblical narratives. It has been diffi
cult to decide whether biblical narratives are about real orfictive events. (Funk 1988:296) 
A t issue in the debate is the question o f which should dom inate in tex tual interpretation, the information internal (intrinsic) to the text or con textual information that is external (extrinsic) to the text, like the author' s intent, his biography or the historical and cultural climate o f his times.
(P etersen 1985:6)
Currently, however, the debate am ong literary critics hinges on the re lated question o f ju st how determinitive even intrinsic textual informa-

ISSN 0259 9422 . / / 7 Ï ■«//<» 2 f/OPJ)Soda] Scicncc and Literary Criticism tion is o f our understanding and interpretation o f texts. One polar position in the debate is that o f radical determinacy (e g, E D H irsdi), in which it is believed that valid interpretations can be arrived at; the other polar position is that o f radical indeterminacy (eg, J Derrida), in which it
is believed that we cannot validly interpret a text because texts have many meanings, not merely one right one. (P etersen 1985:6) The three quotations above locate the ground from which most of the em erging dis cussion betw een social science and literary critics arises.' Strictly speaking, of cour se, not all the argum ents are special ones betw een literary and social-science critics. All of this is a way of saying, of course, that our sense of 'reality' is itself a social construct, and it is therefore to be understood as 'fictive' in the sam e sense th at n ar rative texts are fictive. 'R eality' is not an objective item that can be set over against the fictive world of the text as if it w ere o f a different order. The contrast betw een fictive world and real world is a false one. But for social-science critics it is most im portant to recognise that sense of reality is socially constructed. It may vary in som e m easure for individuals in the sam e society, but it rem ains profoundly social in cha racter. A nd this m eans th at, like language, thoughts and fexts, so also the acts of w riting, read in g and in te rp re tin g can never be co n stru ed as m erely textual acts.
They are social acts as well. They all occur in and are lim ited by a particular social location. They all particip ate in the fictive ch aracter of all hum an symbolic in te r action.
Such then are the assum ptions most social science critics make going in. To us they are essential, the sine qua non of textual in terpretation. With these presuppo sitions in front of us, th erefo re, we must turn directly to a discussion o f w hat is at stake for us as social science critics when we read a text. W e may begin by saying th a t social-science critics a re co m m itted to a h istorical read in g o f biblical texts.
Since we have our own angle from which to view that m atter, however, it is im por tant to think about it at several distinct levels. Obviously we are not talking about a 224
historicising naiveté which assum es a one-to-one relationship betw een stories and events.
Initially an assertion o f historical interest might be construed to get us into the ongoing deb ate abou t the relation o f the gospel texts to the real history of Jesus of N azareth. T h at is obviously a historical question at its most basic level. Yet while that debate is an im portant one which, in many ways, is at a crossroads in New T es tam ent scholarship right now, and much as it might be ap p ro p riate to com m ent in o rd er to discuss thoroughly the n ature o f fictive, fictional and historical narratives, se to the social-sciences, the judgem ent that a text is or is not historical is all too of ten m ade on eth n o ce n tric or anachronistic grounds. We rightly insist, th erefore, that anyone trying to assert that a text claims no historical referent, or that a particu lar referen t is or is not historical, should do so in explicitly socio-historical term s.
Claims based on the latest ideological version of w estern idealism are singularly u n persuasive.
It is also possible, of course, to raise historical questions about literatu re other than allegedly historical narratives. W ith fictional narrative -parables for example -the ground shifts slightly and forces us to address historical concerns at new levels.
O ne of these has to do with w hat literary critics call 'v erisim ilitude' -referred to above (also called 'recuperation', 'naturalisation', 'm otivation' -see Funk 1988:293; T olbert 1989:30, especially note 19) , that is, with the 'realism ' that even parables use in o rd er to establish plausibility for a story. The social-science critic's concern for history can have much to say about how verisim ilitude is created. Plausible stories, like plausible language, w hether intentionally historical or intentionally fictional, are always em bedded in a social system and always encode it in very substantial ways.
W ithout that, the verisim ilitude the fiction w riter requires would not be possible at
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Social Sdcncc and Literary CriticLsm all. O ur concern then is that, even when dealing with fictional texts, the socially and historically dated character of the encoding system comes into play.
A good exam ple can be found in the recen t work o f the Jesus Sem inar of the W estar Institute (Sonom a, C alifornia). In reading through the rep o rt o f the Jesus S em inar on the parables of Jesus one gets the im pression th at of the many criteria for authenticity the au th o rs claim to use, one p red o m in ates (Funk, Scott & Butts 1988) . It is the b e lie f th a t Jesu s' a u th en tic p a rab les pose 'o u trag eo u s' o r 'highly exaggerated' situations for the re ad er to ponder. T he authors readily acknowledge that the m etaphors in parables are taken from everyday life, yet they claim that 'Je sus chooses m etaphors that surprise (the leaven as as figure of the holy), or that ex aggerate (everyone refuses to com e to a dinner), or that satirise (the m ustard seed pokes fun at the mighty cedar th at represents Israel). The read er must always look fo r the surprising twist in the story, the unusual figure, th e paradoxical p a tte rn ' (Funk et al 1988:16) . TTie problem here, o f course, is that one must know the typical before one can designate som ething atypical or surprising. T h e com m ent noted above ab o u t all th e guests refusing to com e when invited to a d in n er provides an example. This k e n a rio struck the Jesus Sem inar participants as outrageous, exagge rated behaviour. They tre a te d it as atypical (Funk et al 1988:43) . But how could ystem of social conventions is itself a historical reality, a reality of a n o th er time, a n o th e r place and an o th er culture, it must be uncovered and recovered in ord er to understand in w hat way the text is an em bodim ent of it. Social-science criticism is thus historical in a very fu ndam ental sense: it assum es th at a social system of the past, from a culture th at precedes the industrial revolution, is the necessary key to understanding the language in the text. A nd that is tru e w hether the text claims a historical referen t o r not. The verisim ilitude and its contravention on which p ara bles depend is itself dependent on a historically locatable social system that the text encodes.
R elated to this concern over the use o f verisim ilitude in the p arab le texts, of course, is the assertion of some literary critics that biblical texts, and particularly the parables, are to be construed as rh etorical-aesthetic objects and th erefo re studied primarily for their formal properties as art. For some critics this allows discussion of the parab les ap art from any consideration of their historical or social location b e cause m eaning is construed to em erge from the characteristics o f the text as text, not from the encoding of the social system in the text.
We can leave aside the controversy over the degree to which formal characteris tics in a text carry the freight claim ed for them , though som e stru ctu ralist claims about univer.sality of pattern have rightly been criticised by both historians and an thropologists. For social science critics the main problem in some treatm ents o f for mal properties has once again to do with our concern for anachronism and ethnocentrism . We rightly ask w hether the forms the critics claim to see are constructs conditioned by the social location of the critics themselves. M any, o f course, acknow ledge th at text and context in te ra c t in th e pro d u ctio n of m eaning. W hatever weight they may assign to context, they assum e that it provides the backdrop for reading and interpretation. U nfortunately, however, that does not quite say enough for eith er the historian or the social science critic.Â t the outset we acknow ledged that the so called 're a l' world is itself a fictive construct. It does not differ in kind from the fictive w orld th at narrative creates.
T h at contrast is a fal.se one that drives a non-existent wedge betw een text and con text. A nd, most em phatically, we would argue that real world, context, call it what you will, cannot be simply 'background' for reading a text. T hat likewise implies the two are discreet realities. But the text encodes, is em bedded in, reflects, responds to and is inextricably dep en den t on the social life-world it em bodies. D ivorce it from th at world and it is no longer the sam e text. The point is a critical one. Rem oved from its social location in the M editerranean world of the first century, a parable is no longer the sam e parable. A fter all, the plausibility the p arab les a ttem p t to in voke is a plausibility in their world, not ours. An additional problem , now widely re cognised by literary critics them selves, is that construing text and context as sep ara ble entities not only fails to take social location seriously, it fails to take the reader in to acco u n t as w ell. R e a d e rs, at least real rea d ers, do stan d o u tsid e th e text.
M oreover, they do so in a particular social location o f th eir own. This m eans that the question of m eaning cannot be divorced from the question about w ho is doing the reading. Texts w ithout contexts are no less com plete than texts w ithout readers.
A nd that is because the real re ad er brings to the act o f reading a world of h is/h e r own, from which a great deal is drawn into the conversation as text and reader inter act.
It is obvious that not everything necessary to a conversation can be w ritten down because a text simply cannot say everything th at needs to be known ab o u t a topic u n d er discussion. T o do so would be tedious in the extrem e and clutter the text to T hese c riteria a re not to be used, she argues, to discrim inate b etw een 'right and w rong' interpretations (which are in theory ruled out), but rath er betw een in terp re tations that are m ore or less 'persuasive' to 'm odern' readers. We may note in pas sing th at the problem s with T o lb e rt's list are legion, hence som e w ould no doubt w ant to form ulate it differently. But the real issue here is not the adequacy of T ol b e rt's list. It is ra th e r that any list of criteria for validity in in terp re tatio n m ust be prefaced with a critical assum ption. U nless we buy into the fallacy o f the a u to n o mous text, authorial intent (w hether or not we can say fully what it is) and authorial location in the M editerran ean world o f the first century m ean th at plausible in ter pretations, if they are truly interpretations and not platform s, and if they are truly in terp retatio n s of this text ra th e r than som e other, are lim ited to those th at address the authorial audience, not the m odern one. E thnocentric and anachronistic read iS S N 0 2 5 9 9 A 2 1^H T S 4 9 /IA 2 (l9 9 3 )
Social Sdcncc and Literary Crilidsm ings may be interesting, but they fail to take seriously a comm unicative dim ension in the text, they disrespect the very creativity of the a u th o r which th e literary critic claims to be constitutive of the text and they allow the needs o f the m odern read er ('interesting', 'persuasive to the m odern read er') to overshadow the text to such d e gree that it ceases to be little m ore than a set of directions for self-expression. We thus em phatically assert the need to take au th o rial in ten t -in the sense of social convention -seriously if an in terp re ta tio n is claim ed to be an in terp re ta tio n of a particular text rather than som e o th er one.
Obviously these questions and reflections could go on. But in looking over the ram blings above, it seem s that a num ber of m atters stand out for those who are in te rested in the social sciences and New T estam ent interpretation. It really does m at ter to us that authors, texts, audiences, readers and meanings are understood to en code and incarnate historically and culturally locatable social systems. It does m at ter th at the range of m eanings in a text is lim ited by the social system the text e n codes and th at w renching it away from th at system irretrievably alters the text. It does m a tte r to us th a t texts are com m unication and th at they have au th o rs with som ething to .say. A nd finally, it m atters to us that writing, reading, hearing and in terpreting are all, in a fundam ental and inviolable .sense, the most social of acts.
E ndnotes
